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Counsel for Petitioner respectfully submits the following Reply Brief pursuant to 
Rule 50, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
FACTS 
1. On or about April 6,1990, the fact that Peter W. Billings and Peter W. 
Billings, Jr., are both partners for Fabian and Clendenin came to the attention of E. H. 
Fankhauser, counsel for Petitioner. 
2. After further inquiry, counsel for Petitioner confirmed the fact that both 
Peter W. Billings and Peter W. Billings, Jr. are related to the Hon. Judith Billings by 
affinity within the third degree, to wit: Father-in-Law and Brother-in-Law respectively. 
3. Judge Judith Billings wrote the opinion in the case of Regional Sales 
Agency. Inc.. v. Reichert. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), having sat on 
the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that heard the case. 
4. Bryce Roe of Fabian & Clendenin was Counsel for Respondent Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc. 
5. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, written by Judge Billings, 
reversed and remanded on issues which are monetarily of interest to Bryce Roe and the 
firm of Fabian & Clendenin. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Petitioner desires to clarify an error in his initial petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The last paragraph of Petitioner's "Summary of the Opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals" reads: 
This Court should note that in each case where the 
trial court entered a discretionary ruling contrary to 
the RegionaTs interests, that the Court of Appeals 
reversed and in the case where the trial court 
exercised its discretion in favor of the interests pf 
Petitioner, the Court of Appeals upheld the lowter 
court. 
Brief of Petitioner at 2. (emphasis added) That paragraph is hereby changed to read: 
This Court should note that in each case where the trial court 
entered a discretionary ruling contrary to RegionaTs 
interests, that the Court of Appeals reversed and in the case 
where the trial court exercised its discretion in favor of the 
interests of Regional, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower 
court. 
POINT II 
The Utah Supreme Court should grant the request of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari in 
order to correct the failure of Judge Billings to disqualify herself from the proceedings 
before the Utah Court of Appeals due to her relationship to partners of the firm of Fabian & 
Clendenin. 
The legal profession generally, and the bench in particular, has been charged with 
the duty to uphold the highest of ethical standards, among which is the duty to disqualify 
oneself from judicial proceedings in order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In 
a recent case, this Court confirmed the wisdom such standards: 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, 
but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of 
unfairness. 
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), at 1221 The 
Anderson case not only established the fact that there are rules of conduct and statutes 
requiring a Judge to either disclose certain conflicting interests (or potentially conflicting 
interests) to the parties or to disqualify oneself from the proceedings, but additionally, that 
it may be unconstitutional not to do so. The United States Supreme Court held that: 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process. 
In re Murchison. 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1, et seq. requires Judge's to disqualify themselves for 
certain relationships or interests with either parties to litigation, or the litigation itself. In 
order to comply with the requirements of this statute, a Judge or Justice must know or be 
2 
able to determine, whether or not a party to litigation is related by either consanguinity or 
by affinity within the third degree, calculated as per the rules of common law. Although 
Judge Billings, is not a party to this case, she nevertheless must know or be able to 
determine her own family interests or potential interests in litigation to the third degree, 
including relationships based upon common-law affinity. One could not reasonably argue 
that she is unaware of her relationship by affinity to her father-in-law or her brother-in-law, 
or of their financial interest in the outcome of this case as partners of the firm representing 
Respondent 
In addition to the relative bright line rules of the Utah Code, the Code of Judicial 
Conduct sheds significant light upon the reasons for which a Judge should either disclose 
an interest or potential interest to the parties to litigation, which may result in the need for 
disqualification. Canon 3(Q(l)(d)(iifl of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifies and 
requires disqualification if: 
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse 
of such a person 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding; 
This portion of the Code of Judicial Conduct applies to the facts at hand, and Judge 
Billings should have disqualified herself from the proceedings. There is no doubt that the 
firm of Fabian & Clendenin (and the partners) profits from the reversals specified in the 
opinion written by Judge Billings. This Court should grant the Writ requested in order to 
determine the issue of judicial misconduct on the part of Judge Billings. 
Canon 3(D) of the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge with a potentially 
conflicting interest which could be a violation of the canons to present the issue of conflict 
to the parties, and allow the parties to waive the requirement of disqualification. Judge 
Billings never made the relationship known to the parties. Instead counsel for the 
3 
Petitioner had to discover such conflict of interest. Counsel was thereafter placed in the 
uncomfortable position of explaining the conflict of interest to his client, being able to offer 
no valid explanation to his client as to why Judge Billings did not disqualify herself or 
make her relationship known. The purpose of the canons of judicial ethics is to avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety and unfairness, The fact that Petitioner's cause was reversed 
substantially on review by the Court of Appeals, especially by the very active and 
aggressive role taken by Judge Billings at and following oral argument, is inexplicable to 
Petitioner as a lay person seeking his day in a fair and impartial court The parties must 
waive their right to disqualification of a judicial officer based upon a disclosed partiality or 
impartiality, not counsel or the bench. The canons of judicial conduct have placed the 
power to waive in the hands of the parties. Therefore, this Court should review the 
arguments of Petitioner herein, not from the point of view of whether or not an attorney or 
Justice of the Court would be offended by the conduct of Judge Billings, but from the point 
of view of the lay person, whose interest in fairness and impartiality is at stake. 
Petitioner's request for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted in order for this Court to 
clarify the conduct of judges who actually have or may have an improper conflict of interest 
in litigation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /O day of /?J?/€j I— 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this. .day of . J#/?/tSM/ • 1990,1 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplementary Brief of Petitioner for Writ 
of Certiorari, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
BRYCEEROE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
^ / f ^ i ^ ^ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, and Cross-Respondent 
below, Respondent herein, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Defendant/Respondent and Cross-
Appellant below, Petitioner herein. 
AFFIDA VIT OF E. H. FANKHAUSER 
SUPPORTING REPLY OF 
PETITIONER TO 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petition No: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER, duly sworn, deposes and states under oath: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein. 
2. I am an attorney in good standing licensed in the State of Utah, 
3. I am counsel for Petitioner herein. 
4. I have diligently and timely executed the forms and documents and other 
papers required in this Petition, based upon the facts available to me at the time of executing 
said documents and papers. 
5. On or about April 6,1990,1 became aware for the first time of the fact that 
Judge Judith Billings, who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals in the case of 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, was possibly related to certain partners at the firm 
of Fabian & Clendenin, counsel for Respondent herein. 
6. I subsequently initiated a diligent inquiry into the relationship of Judge 
Billings and Peter Billings and Peter Billings Jr., and discovered that they are Judge 
Billing's Father-in-Law and Brother-in-Law, respectively, and that they are partners at 
Fabian & Clendenin. 
7. I was surprised to learn of this since Judge Billings had made no mention to 
me or my client of her relationship with the firm representing Respondent. 
8. I thereafter initiated legal research which resulted in the writing of the Reply 
Brief, to which this Affidavit is annexed. 
9. I have explained the relationship of Judge Billings to my client, Roland W. 
Reichert, Petitioner herein, who was shocked to learn of these facts and feels that he was 
the victim of injustice based upon his perception of bias on the part of Judge Billings. 
10. Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this day of &M/1-—'. 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ON this 10 day of Apr i l , 19 9 0 personally appeared 
before me Ephraim H. Fankhauser signer of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that s/he executed the same*? 
Residing at: Sal 
My Comm'n e; 
Utah (7")m, 'A^ 
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FACTS 
Respondent's brief contains statements which are in error and 
require clarification or verification by Appellant for the benefit of the 
Court. Respondent states in its brief at page 5, "the Court issued a 
Temporary Restraining Order against Reichert on March 28, 1984." This 
statement is incorrect. Regional Sales, as Plaintiff, filed a Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction with the trial court. (R 13-15) The Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction was denied after evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Croft. (See Memorandum Decision R. 48-50, R 61-66) 
The record regarding and chronology of Defendant's motions to 
amend his counterclaim need clarification. The first Amendment to 
Counterclaim of Defendant was filed on April 30, 1987 (R. 132-133), and 
was for the purpose of adding the affirmative defense of failure of 
consideration based on the documentary information obtained at the 
deposition of Helen Kiholm taken shortly before on April 23, 1987. The 
documentation consisted mainly of the corporate tax returns and earnings 
of Regional Sales Corporation, which documents were presented in the trial 
before Judge Russon. Reichert deemed the Amendment to the 
Counterclaim appropriate in view of paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint 
which alleged "all conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under the 
agreement have been performed or have occurred." (Paragraph 9 was 
summarily denied, R. 29, paragraph 4 of Answer) Inherent in this 
allegation is the argument that Regional Sales alleged full performance on 
its part under the 1979 agreement. Denial of that paragraph, and the 
claims of the Counterclaim as first submitted placed the performance of 
Regional Sales under the alleged 1979 agreement at issue. The 
documentation obtained at the deposition of Helen Kjholm, which had not 
been previously available although it had been requested by Defendant, 
clearly indicated that Regional Sales had failed to pay the 40% commission 
earned by Mr. Reichert from 1977 through 1983, as required by the 
alleged agreement of 1979. This argument was clearly set forth in the 
Amendment to Counterclaim. (R. 132) 
Respondent, Regional Sales, at page six of its brief takes issue with 
the statement of Reichert regarding the basis upon which Judge Russon 
recused himself. Regional Sales states that Reichert's contentions are not 
true, to wit: Judge Russon recused himself "due to the evasive conduct of 
Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of counsel." For 
whatever importance this issue may have to this Court, Mr. Reichert calls 
attention to the record in this matter, beginning at the transcript page 
number 77: 
THE COURT: Mr. Fankhauser, I want you to 
wait for the witness. You keep speaking over. 
Let me say this: If you are trying to make the 
trier of fact understand what you are trying to 
get at, you are not doing too red hot of a job. 
You cut in so. Then, I cannot understand what 
the answer is, and I don't know what she has said. 
I have gone on like this for a page an a half. You 
need to ask questions and let her answer. 
FANKHAUSER: What I am having a problem 
with, the witness does not respond to the question. 
She gives me a narrative. 
THE COURT: I have heard a lot of narratives 
in Court and that certainly is objectionable if she 
does that. She needs to answer your question. 
Sometimes when she is answering your question, 
she gets about four words out, you cut her off and 
go right on to something else. I won't argue with 
you. Move on and do what I am saying. 
4 
FANKHAUSER: I am explaining why I am 
doing what I am doing. 
THE COURT: Let's call a recess and I will see 
both counsel in chambers. 
During the recess , in chambers, Judge Russon made an offer to 
recuse himself from the case, as substantiated at page 72 of the 
Supplemental Transcript, as follows: 
THE COURT: We had a meeting in chambers. 
I have offered to Mr. Fankhauser as settlement, a 
recusal. He has asked me to recuse myself and I 
will do that. The case is terminated at this point. 
Based upon the transcript of the proceedings before Judge Russon, as cited, 
the statement of Respondent and footnote 1 of its brief, are incorrect. 
Following the recusal of Judge Russon, Defendant filed a new motion 
to Amend Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 15, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which motion was timely filed. At that 
time Defendant proposed amending his Answer and Counterclaim to 
include failure of consideration and, for the first time, the affirmative 
defense of breach of contract. (R. 160-61) This motion was filed on May 
22, 1987, several months prior to trial before Judge Brian. 
Mr. Reichert wishes to clarify the giving of jury instructions in 
response to the arguments of Regional Sales that it was error when the 
court failed to give instruction number eight. Instruction number eight is 
found at R. 187. This requested instruction was submitted on December 
14, 1987. thereafter, Regional Sales submitted supplemental requested jury 
instructions on December 16, 1987, and requested that its instruction 
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number eighteen be given if the court refused to give number eight. The 
court below thereafter made the substitution as requested. Therefore, the 
instruction actually given to which Regional Sales objects pertaining to 
liquidated damages is its own instruction. 
Finally, regarding Regional Sales arguments for attorney's fees, this 
Court should carefully note several important deficiencies in Mr. Roe's 
affidavit for fees. (R. 313-315) Paragraph four of the affidavit 
acknowledges that he was unable to obtain the actual hours worked during 
the period of January 24, 1984 to December 31,1985, while he was at Roe 
& Fowler. Instead, he "estimated" the figure of 42 hours, all of which 
apply to the failed attempt at an injunction and related matters. Mr. Roe 
states that his customary rate is $130 per hour, but fails to even allege that 
this is a reasonable rate for the services performed, the complexity of the 
case, or that the rate is reasonable when compared to other rates in the area 
for similar work. Instead, he simply states a self-interested opinion that the 
hours billed and the rate charged are reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Judge Brian's Failure to Grant Reichert's Motion to Amend the 
Counterclaim, made pursuant to Rule 15. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion 
As has been previously argued, Judge Brian's failure to grant 
Reichert's Motion to Amend Counterclaim constituted an abuse of 
discretion . The denial of the motion was not in the interests of justice and 
did not promote a trial on the merits of the case, but summarily dismissed 
important claims of Reichert for affirmative relief. Furthermore, Judge 
Brian, relying on the previous ruling of Judge Russon regarding the 
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amendment of Reichert's Coimterclaim, failed to take into consideration the 
fact that Judge Russon had not ever ruled on Reichert's claim of breach of 
contract which was raised for the first time before Judge Brian. Such was 
a further abuse of discretion. The motion to amend should have been 
granted, and Reichert should have had his day in court. Certainly, the 
granting of the motion would have eliminated all sorts of potential 
confusion regarding the use of parol evidence regarding whether or not the 
1979 agreement was a sham. The jury verdict should stand, or in the 
alternative, if remanded, Reichert should be allowed to bring his 
counterclaim for breach of contract, which remedy the Court of Appeals 
improperly denied. 
POINT II 
Regional Sales incorrectly asserts that its performance under the 
1979 agreement was not at issue. This Court may note that the bulk of Mr. 
Reichert's defense and case rested upon claims that the performance of 
Regional Sales was at issue, and that they had not performed under the 
1979 agreement which they sought to enforce. Reichert raised these issues 
in an effort to contest the prima facie case of Regional Sales for breach of 
contract on his part. The breach of regional Sales was committed from 
1979 through 1983, following the execution of the 1979 agreement. 
Regional did not pay the 40% commissions to Reichert in that time, but 
continued to operate under the previous oral agreement to the end of 1982, 
which provided that Reichert would be paid a salary. Since the breach of 
Regional Sales preceded that alleged against Reichert, and since the 
agreement of 1979 was a sham, Reichert was relieved of performance 
under the agreement, according to his defenses, the evidence and his 
arguments before, during and after trial. Regional Sales was therefore not 
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entitled to damages at all. Such a denial of damages going to Regional 
Sales constitutes a straightforward "negative" defense by Reichert. 
Negative defenses do not require separate pleading, as do affirmative 
defenses. In this sense, set off and recoupment may or may not require 
separate pleading, depending on the manner of their use. If they are used 
to seek an affirmative recovery, they require a separate pleading. If they 
are used in a purely defensive manner, i.e., to address the prima facie 
elements of Plaintiffs case, or used to defend against the allegations raised 
by Plaintiff, then they do not require separate pleading under rule 8(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Professor Moore states, regarding pleading of "affirmative defenses" 
not listed in Rule 8(c): 
An analysis of Plaintiffs Prima Facie case is 
necessary in applying the [clause in Rule 8(c) 
which requires affirmative pleading of "any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense"]. Any matter that does not tend to 
controvert the opposing parties prima facie case 
as determined by applicable substantive law 
should be pleaded, and is not put in issue by a 
denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b). 
Moore. Pleading and Procedure, at 8-182. commenting on Rule 8, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore, the definition of a negative defense is one raised by mere 
denials, which address the prima facie claims of Regional Sales. Insofar as 
set off and recoupment were used by Reichert to mitigate or deny the 
damages claimed by Regional Sales, they constituted negative defenses 
raised by Reichert's denials. Evidence supportive of these denials was 
properly admitted, even though the same evidence could be also used to 
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support an affirmative claim for relief. The verdict of the jury was not 
therefore tainted by the admission of evidence by Reichert relating to the 
failure of performance of Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals erred in 
finding that such evidence was improperly admitted and in holding that it 
confused the jury, and in further holding that Reichert, on remand, would 
not be allowed to use such evidence, even in a purely defensive manner. 
If, contrary to Reichert's contentions, this Court holds that Reichert 
was required to affirmatively plead breach of contract and that his motion 
to include this in his counterclaims was properly denied, we must examine 
the effect of a failure to plead. Professor Moore states: 
If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it is 
waived to the extent that the party who should 
have pleaded the affirmative defense may not 
introduce evidence in support thereof. 
Moore at 8-184. 
If Reichert failed to plead an affirmative defense in claiming set off 
and recoupment, nevertheless, he was free to use any and all evidence 
provided by Regional Sales to advance his claims, and would have been 
limited only to the extent that he attempted to introduce his own 
independent evidence. 
Regional Sales contentions that the admission of exhibit "I" 
constituted error are not well founded in view of the fact that they were all 
based upon evidence provided by Regionals Sales which was previously 
admitted. Exhibit "I" (see T. 175-182) was based upon invoices maintained 
by Regional Sales for the year 1981. Exhibit 10, introduced by Regional 
Sales also involved the use of those invoices used by Reichert. (T. 219-227, 
especially 221 and 226-7) Therefore, Exhibit "I" is merely a reliance upon 
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evidence before the jury in the form of Exhibit 10. Reichert was therefore 
entitled to introduce Exhibit "I" and argue its contents, in spite of 
contentions of failure to plead breach of contract as an affirmative defense 
or claim. 
POINT III 
There was no Error in Giving Instruction Eighteen in Place of Requested 
Instruction Eight. 
Regional Sales complains of error in the giving of instruction 
eighteen in place of requested instruction eight. As has been previously 
mentioned, Instruction eighteen was suggested by Regional Sales in the 
event that number eight was not given. According to Utah law, this does 
not constitute appealable error: 
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not assign 
as error either the giving or failure to give an 
instruction unless he first proposes correct 
instructions, and should the court fail to give 
them, to then except thereto. 
Snyderville Transp. Co.. Inc. v. Christiansen. 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980). 
Since Regional Sales requested replacement instruction (number 
eighteen) was in fact given, there was not appealable error. The jury 
verdict should therefore be allowed to stand. 
Conclusion 
In addition to those arguments and points previously made by 
Reichert, this reply brief supplements and clarifies the issues of this appeal 
in several importance regards. First, the Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
was wrongfully denied by Judge Brian. It was made well in advance of 
trial before Judge Brian, and did not result in prejudice since the 
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performance of Regional Sales was already contested by the original 
Answer and Counterclaim. Furthermore, it contained the claim of breach 
of contract, which Judge Brian did not address, but which was never before 
raised in pleadings or otherwise. Second, Set off and recoupment were 
proper issues before the trier of fact and addressed the very heart of 
Regional Sales claims, which were denied in the Answer and Counterclaim 
originally filed by Reichert. Third, the giving of Jury instruction eighteen 
was not appealable error since it was the requested replacement of Regional 
Sales itself. Fourth, as has been pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the 
affidavit of Mr. Roe regarding attorney's fees was wholly deficient in 
several important regards, as stated in the cases previously cited, including 
Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), and Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), which summarizes the law of Trayner 
and previous cases on this point. 
The Court of Appeals erred in placing itself in the stead of the trier 
of fact. Again Reichert would remind this Court and counsel that the 
verdict herein was a "black box" general verdict, and not a special verdict. 
Therefore, the risk of substituting the appellate court's judgment 
improperly for that of the trier or fact runs high. The jury verdict should 
stand. If, however, this case is again remanded, Mr. Reichert should be 
given the opportunity to have his day in court, to make his claims and 
counterclaims, and to allow fairness and justice to be served thereby. 
Respectfully submitted this CTday of tjf^n^ . 1990. 
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